Women's Healthcare: Digital Surveillance on Healthcare Apps

An analysis of the post-Dobbs era and how healthcare apps might be affected

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Published March 13th, 2026

Written by Lauren Jentsch

In 2022, the world watched as the Supreme Court overturned the landmark Roe v. Wade (1973). The result, Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022), called into question the intrinsic regard of the Constitution protecting a person’s right to privacy, especially regarding its origins in the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. As we move into a post-Dobbs world, we note that the digital rights of people regarding their own data becomes increasingly significant as health care is managed across digital platforms. Specifically, we need to evaluate whether law enforcement agencies can use digital records to prosecute a person for reproductive actions, and the impact that such a law may have.

In order to fully understand the scope of the increasing use of technology, one must consider the reasons behind gathering data. In a surveillance/informational capitalism world, personal digital data is gathered and sold, most commonly used to generate targeted ads and engagement on social media platforms. Thus, capturing large amounts of personal data off mobile apps has become increasingly incentivized for competitive companies in the digital sphere trying to maximize economic profit, according to UChicago’s Aziz Huq. The impacts of this informational economy on reproductive healthcare increase the vulnerability of digital participants to data privacy issues, particularly how companies collect biometric data, track information acquisition in search engines and social networks, and allow for the increasing pervasiveness of location tracking tools on all of these platforms. According to the American Bar Association, law enforcement can purchase this information from data brokers, who have used machine learning tools to analyze large pools of data. The market for this information is largely unregulated and open to all people, including private citizens and governmental actors.

Data on all of this collected information can be obtained through multiple sources, including the original device, wiretap orders, and geofence warrants. Warrants, traditionally used to check the government’s power, give very little protection against demands to obtain information in these channels. Additionally, many health-tracking apps are not covered by HIPAA laws, which only cover traditional healthcare providers and third party providers acting on behalf of said covered entities. 

Some proponents of an open digital information market may argue that by using these apps and agreeing to the terms and conditions, people inherently accept the risk of their data being sold. According to the Journal of Medical Internet Research, many apps rely on methods of guaranteeing the terms and conditions that do not adequately ensure that people have read them and are making educated decisions in whether to accept them. Furthermore, a study was conducted by researchers at University College London to evaluate the effectiveness of in-app policies in protecting consumer data. They found that 35% of the apps claimed not to share personal data in one section of their terms and conditions statements but then contradicted this statement in their privacy policies. Additionally, 50% provided explicit assurance that health data would not be shared with advertisers but were ambiguous about if this included data collected through using the app. Furthermore, 45% of privacy policies outlined the original app’s lack of responsibility for the practices of any third parties. Overall, this displays a resolute standing of irresponsibility on the part of these apps to make significant moves towards protecting the privacy of consumers’ data in relation to third party uses, or in increasing the awareness of consumers that they are inherently exposing their health data in using the app.

A statement released by the American Bar Association notes how the current digital age opens unprecedented access to incriminating information, including search query histories, health and fitness apps, and period tracking apps. In a world in which one in 3 people wear fitness watches, highly personal health information becomes increasingly tracked and thus people become increasingly vulnerable if their data is released for public use. Furthermore, approximately 56% of menstruating people use smartphones, which also collect health information data, though often to a lesser extent. The ABA also notes that correlations between pregnancy conditions and other digital data can be made, including online grocery orders or hovering a cursor over certain videos longer than others. Thus, we can note that issues related to digital data collection are not limited simply to traditional ideas, such as search history, but expanded to extremely minute details.

Furthermore, multiple routes of scholarship have analyzed how this situation might exacerbate inequitable health outcomes. According to the World Health Organization, low-income, rural, Black, and other minority communities have an increased risk of using health apps as supplements for access to healthcare and thus an increased risk of being targeted for seeking reproductive health care through these channels. Women typically gain more control over their health with digital technologies, which facilitates exercising the fundamental right to health care. However, where these digital technologies offer the opportunity of expanded healthcare, they also require that the populations using them to access healthcare accept the risk that their information may be taken by the government and used to prosecute them for criminalized abortions. 

In coming years, cases will continue to be litigated to define the Fourth Amendment’s scope in protecting the sensitive health data of persons using apps to manage their reproductive health care. The implications, as lined out, would be strongest felt by communities already lacking access to both reproductive and holistic healthcare.

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